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It is well-established that, when confronted with a decision to be taken under risk,
individuals use reference payoff levels as important inputs. The purpose of this paper is to
study which reference points characterize decisions in a setting in which there are several
plausible reference levels of payoff. We report an experiment, in which we investigate
which of four potential reference points: (1) a population average payoff level, (2) the
announced expected payoff of peers in a similar decision situation, (3) a historical average
level of earnings that others have received in the same task, and (4) an announced
anticipated individual payoff level, best describes decisions in a decontextualized risky
decision making task. We find heterogeneity among individuals in the reference points
they employ. The population average payoff level is the modal reference point, followed
by experimenter’s stated expectation of a participant’s individual earnings, followed in
turn by the average earnings of other participants in previous sessions of the same
experiment. A sizeable share of individuals showmultiple reference points simultaneously.
The reference point that best fits the choices of the individual is not affected by a shock
to her income.
Keywords: reference point, experiment, decision making, risk
1. INTRODUCTION
Economic decision making under risk involves the consideration of the probabilities of various
outcomes, as well as the perceived utilities of these outcomes. However, empirical work has
suggested that when judging and evaluating a risky lottery, reference payoff levels are also critical.
A payoff appears to be evaluated based on how it compares to a reference level, with a reference
point serving to separate desirable from undesirable outcomes, according to some criterion. Thus,
understanding how payoff levels come to be viewed as reference points is a key step in uncovering
the cognitive process that generates decisions taken under risk.
Indeed, reference dependence, an asymmetry in the treatment of payoffs above vs. below a
benchmark payoff level, has been a robust finding in both economics and psychology, since it
was first proposed and documented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Reference dependence is
a cornerstone of prospect theory, the most influential behavioral model of decision making under
risk. Reference points have been shown to characterize decision making in laboratory research,
surveys, and in field data from numerous domains. These domains include household saving, labor
market participation, consumer behavior, education, and investment decisions (see e.g., Hardie
et al., 1993; Camerer, 1997, 2004; Starmer, 2000; Grinblatt and Han, 2005). Experimental studies
have documented the effect of reference point formation on the provision of effort (Abeler et al.,
2011), the pricing of securities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and the exchange and valuation of
consumer products (Ericson and Fuster, 2011).
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However, while there is general agreement that reference
points are important, little is known about which payoff levels will
come to serve as reference points. Typically, in empirical work,
the reference points of the decision maker are taken as evident
given the decision context. This is reasonable in some settings,
though less plausible in others. There are no widely-accepted,
general accounts of how a particular payoff level emerges as a
reference point.
Furthermore, it is not clear that in a particular given decision
context, only one unique reference point is relevant. Kahneman
(1992) raises the possibility of multiplicity of reference points
and characterizes this as an important topic for future study.
Sullivan and Kida (1995) demonstrate that corporate managers
form multiple reference points, specifically the historical profit
level, as well as profit and revenue targets. In an experimental
study, Baucells et al. (2011) show that the reference trading
price of a financial asset is a combination of multiple potential
reference prices.
One class of prominent theories of reference point formation
is based on the expectations of the decision maker herself
(Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Ko˝szegi and Rabin,
2006, 2007; Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2008). Expectations-based
reference points have been used to explain insurance choices
(Barseghyan et al., 2011), and labor supply decisions (Farber,
2005, 2008; Crawford and Meng, 2011). However, the payoffs
that peers receive are also relevant. Experimental work has largely
supported the models of inequity aversion proposed by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), which
assume that the average payoff of peers serves as a reference
point. Furthermore, expectations can be formed through a
history of social interaction, e.g., contracts, experiences, past
trends, or the recommendations of others (Davies and Kandel,
1981; Abel, 1990; Gali, 1994; Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2007;
Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007; Post et al., 2008; Linde and
Sonnemans, 2012). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) point out that
there are multiple candidates that can serve as expectation-
based reference points. They emphasize that candidate reference
points might also coincide. For example, the expectations
of an individual about her own and her peers’ payoffs
may be the same in some instances. The reference point
in effect is obviously consequential. For example, Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2007), argue that the implications of reference
dependence differ depending on the specification of the reference
point.
Thus, there are several candidate expectation-based
reference levels that appear to be prominent. The purpose
of the paper is to study which reference points characterize
decisions in a setting in which there are several plausible
reference levels of payoff. The question we consider here
is individuals differ from each other in their propensity to
use different reference points, when they make decisions in
the same setting. We study which, if any, of four candidate
reference points is most likely to emerge in a decontextualized
setting. If the reference points that emerge vary greatly
by individual, it can only be due to differences arising
from the individuals themselves, rather than the task or the
setting.
To investigate this, we conduct an experiment which allows a
participant to use any or all of four competing reference points
in a risky decision making task. The first is the payoff level
for the individual anticipated by the experimenter (who may be
interpreted as an authority figure or an employer). We abbreviate
this reference point as IE, or Individual Expectation. This level,
indicated on each subject’s instructions, is a natural candidate for
a reference point, since it directly ascribes a benchmark for the
individual to attain. The second potential reference point is the
anticipated average payoffs of peers in the same decision situation
(PE, Peer Expectation). This is also indicated in writing on an
individual’s instructions, with equal prominence as IE. Note that
expectations, as used here, do not refer to an individual’s own
beliefs or aspirations, or to a mathematical expectation of her
payoff. The third is the historical average payoff of others in
the same position in past sessions (HA, Historical Average),
also indicated in the instructions, and the fourth is the average
performance of a relatively large population (PA, Population
Average), which is known to subjects at the time of recruitment
to the session. PE, HA, and PA all represent payoffs of other
individuals in the same or similar experiments, but vary in
the social distance between the parties they apply to and the
individual herself. Because there is no compelling rationale for
believing that one reference point would dominate the others,
we refrain from advancing hypotheses in advance about which
reference points would be most consistent with the data.
In our experimental design, we present three of the reference
points simultaneously, in order to conduct a horse race between
the alternatives. In some session we presented PA, IE, and HA,
while in others session the payoff levels displayed were PA, IE,
and PE. We elicit the certainty equivalents of a large number
of lotteries and obtain estimates of individual reference points.
The design permits the detection of individuals who use none or
one unique reference point, as well as those who employ multiple
reference points concurrently. By using one fixed probability for
gains and losses of 0.5 throughout the experiment, we attenuate
the impact of probability weighting on our results.
It is also important to understand whether reference points
change in response to shocks to wealth levels. Some studies have
considered this topic. Arkes et al. (2008) show that subjects are
more likely to adapt their reference points to gains in their wealth
than to losses. Chen and Rao (2002) stress the importance of
the order of presentation of two equally-sized gains and losses.
They suggest that the first payoff that is presented leads to a more
significant adaptation of the reference point than the second. In a
financial market setting, Baucells et al. (2011) show that reference
prices for a financial asset are a function of the first and the last
trading price. Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) model the theory of
choice in a static setting where the initial endowment or status
quo plays a key role. They show that an agent with reference-
dependent preferences prefers to stay at his status quo as long
as another option does not dominate it in all dimensions. Post
et al. (2008) find evidence of path dependence in reference levels
in choices under risk. One of the treatments in our experiment
is complementary to this strand of research, and allows us to
study the adjustment of the reference point after a shock to one’s
income level.
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Our results show that if all individuals are classified by
the one reference point that they adhere to most closely, the
population average (PA) is employed most frequently followed
by the individual expectation (IE), and then by the historical
average (HA). The social comparison group which is the most
distant though also the largest, the population of experimental
subjects, appears to be the most relevant. Multiple reference
points are observed for a sizable share of individuals, while some
others show no evidence of having any reference point. Many
individuals use a heuristic, in which they value a lottery at a
fixed percentage of its expected value. Finally, we find evidence
that reference points do not change after a shock to income has
occurred. Overall, these results reveal that there is individual-
level heterogeneity in the use of reference points within a fixed
decontextualized setting. Thus, reference point choice is driven
in part by personal inclination.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the experimental design. In Section 3 we discuss the
results, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Conduct of Sessions and Procedures
A total of 44 sessions were conducted at the Centerlab at Tilburg
University in The Netherlands, between November 2013 and
June 2014. Subjects were all Bachelor’s and Master’s students
in Economics and Business Administration, and therefore were
relatively homogeneous in their training. A total of 163 subjects
participated. Fifty-five percent were male. The average age of
member of the subject pool is 22. The experiment was executed
with the z-Tree computer program (Fischbacher, 2007). There
was a varying number of participants per session and each subject
acted independently of others in this individual decision making
experiment. Each session lasted 45 min, including the time
during which the experimenter read the instructions. The payoffs
in the experiment were expressed in terms of an experimental
currency, which was converted to a Euro payment to subjects at
the end of the sessions. The average earnings per subject were 16
Euros (1 Euro = $1.30 approximately at the time the experiment
was conducted).
A session consists of 60 periods. In each period t, subjects
are presented with a binary prospect (1/2, yt), which results
in outcome yt with probability 0.5 and in outcome 0 with
probability 0.5. This prospect is paired with eight different certain
payment levels, xjt, j = 1, ..., 8 in a price list format, during
each of the 60 periods. In each period, each subject must make
eight choices. Each choice in period t is between (1/2, yt) and xjt .
The eight choices are displayed on the subject’s computer screen
simultaneously. The magnitude of xjt ranges in value from 40
to 180% of yt/2, the expected value of the prospect. The certain
payments appear in ascending order of magnitude in the price list
on the computer screen.
The sixty periods are divided into three 20-period segments.
The certain payments xjt , as well as the amount that the lottery
can pay out yt , increases in constant increments from one period
to the next within each segment. The lowest certain amount xjt
chosen by the subject over (0.5, yt) in period t, serves as our
measure of the certainty equivalent for the prospect (0.5, yt) for
that subject. The expected value of the prospects and the potential
certainty equivalents span the four potential reference points.
Thus, the expected values of (0.5, yt), as well as the value of xjt ,
are in some instances in the domain of gains and at other times in
the domain of losses relative to each of the four reference points
we consider.
At the beginning of a session, the experimenter read the
instructions for the experiment aloud. The instructions included
key statements about earnings, which were intended to introduce
the candidate reference points.
Subjects registered through an online system and at that time
were informed of the average earnings in Euros for experiments
of similar length conducted at the laboratory, 12 Euros. This is the
overall average payoff of subjects participating in an experiment
at Centerlab, and we interpret this level as the PA reference point.
At the start of the experiment, each subject was given
information about his/her initial cash balance, which was hers
to keep. This information remained on her computer screen for
the duration of the session. The initial balance was always less
than the PA reference level. Therefore, to reach the PA level, the
subject had to earn the difference between this level and the initial
balance.
The level of the IE reference point was indicated in bold font
on the instructions that subjects received at the beginning of the
session. It was also displayed on participants’ computer screens
for the entire session. It was emphasized that this individual
expectation was not based on any specific knowledge about the
realized final outcome, but only about what could be expected
beforehand based on the way the experiment was designed.
In sessions 2–24, the historical average of earnings of
participants from previous sessions of the experiment (the HA
reference point) was also emphasized in the instructions and
indicated on the computer screens. In sessions 25–44, the PE
reference point was presented similarly.
We varied the magnitudes of the four reference points in
different sessions. The values of each of the four candidate
reference points are shown in Table 1. The first column of
Table 1 indicates the session, and each row groups together
sessions conducted under identical parameters. The next three
columns contain the monetary values, in terms of experimental
currency, of each of the reference points. All four reference
points are net of the initial endowment, which differs by
individual. The PE and IE were adjusted to reflect the different
parameters in effect in different sessions, and the HA differed
because earnings of individuals in previous sessions varied.
Each reference point was always a at a unique value for
an individual subject, and the intervals in the table indicate
the range of differing unique reference points among subjects
in the session indicated. The ranges within each session are
indicated in columns 2 and 3. Columns 5 and 6 give the
exchange rate between experimental currency and Euros in
effect, and whether there was an income shock after period
40. The payoffs were denominated in terms of an experimental
currency that was convertible to Euro at the end of the session,
at a conversion rate indicated in the second-to-last column of
Table 1.
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TABLE 1 | Parameters used in the experiment.
Session Initial balance Expectation of
own earnings (IE)
Historical
Average (HA)
Expectation of
Peers (PE)
Population Average
(PA)
Exchange rate Treatment
1* 3500–6500 5500–8500 – – 9100–12,100 1300 Baseline
2–3 4500–7000 7000–9500 15,600 – 8600–11,100 1300 Baseline
4–5 4500–7000 7000–9500 13,500 – 8600–11,100 1300 Baseline
6–7 4500–7000 7000–9500 12,700 – 8600–11,100 1300 Baseline
8–10 8500–10,500 15,500–17,000 13,100 – 7500–9500 1500 Baseline
13–24 35,000–45,000 45,000–60,000 28,500 – 33,000–43,000 6500 Baseline
25–32 50,000–60,000 70,000–85,000 – 100,000 42,000–52,000 8500 Shift
33–44 50,000–60,000 70,000–85,000 – 100,000 48,000–58,000 9000 Shift
*Session 1 is excluded from the analyses due to the absence of a historical average. IE is the earnings level that the experimenter indicates to individual that is expected of her. PE is the
earnings level that the experimenter indicates to an individual that he/she expects others participating in the same session to earn. HA is the average earnings of individuals in all prior
sessions. PA is 12 Euros, the average earnings in all experimental studies conducted at the laboratory, minus the initial endowment. All reference points are similarly expressed net of
the initial endowment and income shock. Within a session different individuals had different initial balances, IE and PA reference points. Thus, the indicated values are ranges. However,
each individual himself had a unique initial balance, IE and PA level.
At the end of the session, the computer randomly chose one
period t and one of the decisions within that period to count as
each subject’s earnings. Depending on the choice of the subject,
the subject either played the lottery and received one of the
outcomes of the prospect, 0 or yt , or obtained the certain amount
xjt
1.
2.2. Treatments
There were two treatments in the experiment, called Baseline
and Shift. The last subsection described the Baseline treatment.
In the sessions of the Shift treatment, we induced an exogenous
shock to income after the 40th period by paying a bonus that
was unanticipated by subjects. The bonus for each individual
was equal to 50% of the initial endowment. It was emphasized
that the shock was independent of the earlier choices participants
made. The shock was described to participants by the following
announcement made by the experimenter before period 1. “If
during the course of the experiment any new information will
be shown to you on the screen, please note that this is not due
to the decisions you have previously made in the experiment.
The computer does not do anything with your decisions until the
experiment finishes.”
3. RESULTS
This section is organized in the following manner. We first
informally describe the data from two typical subjects. Section
3.1 describes and documents the widespread use of a rule, called
the Proportional Discounting Heuristic, employed by 38% of our
participants. Section 3.2 contains our analysis of the prevalence
of the four different reference points.
Figures 1, 2 illustrate two of the typical decision profiles in
our data. The horizontal axis gives the period number, while
the vertical axis shows monetary amounts expressed in terms
of experimental currency. The points displayed in black are
the expected values of the prospects presented in the period
1Paying only one period removes wealth effects. Starmer and Sugden (1991) have
shown that this procedure generates behavior that is similar to that when all
periods are paid.
indicated. The certainty equivalents elicited from the subject
in the period are given by the gray points. The leftmost panel
shows the expected values of the prospects and the certainty
equivalents elicited in the first 20 periods. The expected values of
these prospects include values both above and below a candidate
reference level. The figure shows that the certainty equivalents
of subject 16, who is depicted in the figure, are greater than the
expected value of the prospects, whenever the expected value lies
in the domain of losses relative to the PA reference point. Thus,
the subject exhibits risk seeking behavior in this domain. When
the expected value of the lottery lies above the PA, the observed
certainty equivalents are less than the expected value of the
prospects, which is consistent with risk averse preferences. Thus,
we observe here that the subject changes her attitude toward risk
at the PA payoff level2.
Another example, for subject 13, is presented in Figure 2.
The certainty equivalents of this subject are all equal to the
expected value of the prospect, whenever the expected value of
the prospect is less than the Historical Average. This indicates
that the individual is risk neutral in the domain of losses, relative
to the HA reference point. When the expected value of the
prospect is greater than HA, the individual becomes risk averse.
3.1. The Proportional Discounting Heuristic
A very common decision rule, employed by 38% of individuals,
is the Proportional Discounting Heuristic. This rule involves
setting a certainty equivalent equal to a constant fraction of
the expected value of the lottery (or alternatively to a constant
fraction of the maximum possible outcome of the lottery),
as is depicted in Figure 3. The agent depicted in this figure
has no reference point in the range spanned by the possible
certain payments offered in the experiment (although we cannot
rule out the possibility that the agent has a reference point at
0, for example). The certainty equivalent of individuals who
proportionally discount is given by:
2One measure of consistency of choices that can be applied to the data is whether
subjects’ certainty equivalent increases from one period to the next within each 20-
period segment. By this criterion, 14 subjects are consistent for all 60 decisions, 46
have fewer than 5 inconsistencies, and 98 have fewer than 10.
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FIGURE 1 | Certainty equivalents of subject 16, who participated in session 5.
FIGURE 2 | Certainty equivalents of subject 13, who participated in session 3.
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FIGURE 3 | Certainty equivalents of subject 100, who participated in session 32 and did not employ a reference point.
Certainty equivalent = α ∗ Expected value of lottery = α ∗ yt/2
(1)
If α = 1, the individual is risk neutral. Another heuristic which is
observationally equivalent is the rule that Certainty equivalent =
θ ∗ yt , where θ = α/2. Our setting is conducive to observing
the proportional discounting heuristic, because of the price list
format and the sequence of presentation of the choices. This
is because if a subject switches from the safe choice xjt to the
risky choice yt at the same row on the table in all periods, his
behavior is consistent with the heuristic. Thus, an individual
who wishes to apply the heuristic would not find it excessively
cognitively demanding to do so. The average α parameter for this
subsample is 0.92, equalling 0.96 for male and 0.90 for female
subjects.
It is possible, if individuals have reference-dependent
preferences, that α can differ between the domains of losses
and gains, as proposed by Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. (2011), Iturbe-
Ormaetxe Kortajarene et al. (2015). Such a shift in the discount
proportion can be seen in the right panel of Figure 2. This
behavior reveals a discrete change in attitude toward risk above
vs. below the reference point. However, in data such as ours,
a classification of individuals according to the behavioral rules
they employ, such as the Proportional Discounting Heuristic,
must allow for some trials to exhibit deviations from the exact
decision consistent with the heuristic. To classify individuals as
users of the Proportional Discounting Heuristic, we calculate the
following:
1 proportional valuation = (certainty equivalent/expected value
lottery)t − (certainty equivalent/
expected value lottery)t− 1
x∗jt/(0.5 ∗ yt) − x
∗
j,t− 1/(0.5 ∗ yt− 1), x
∗
jt
= minj{xjt|xjt < 0.5 ∗ yt} (2)
If the agent uses the proportional valuation heuristic, valuing
every lottery at the same constant fraction of its expected value,
then 1 proportional valuation always equals zero. We classify
an individual as a proportional discounter if she exhibits no
more than six instances over the 60-period session, in which
Equation (2) does not equal 0. Figure 4 illustrates the stability of
the strategy employed on the part of users of the heuristic. The
figure is a histogram of (1 proportional valuation) for the 38%
of the sample that are proportional discounters. The change in
proportional valuation is zero in the great majority of cases.
3.2. Reference Points Employed
To identify the reference points subjects are using, we focus on
the manner whereby a reference point influences decisions. We
test for the presence of a target payoff level by investigating
the choice between playing the lottery and receiving the certain
payment. We expect that the presence of a reference point
will influence decisions when the certain payment is just above
the reference level. In such cases, agents might forego some
expected payoff and choose the certain payment, in order to reach
their reference payoff. To test for this pattern, we model the
choice between the certainty equivalent and the lottery of each
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FIGURE 4 | Density of changes in discount proportion parameter α
between periods t and t+1.
individual as a function of the value of the certainty equivalent,
the expected value of the lottery and a dummy variable indicating
whether the safe option xjt exceeds the reference point.
Zijt = αi + β1,i0.5 ∗ yt + β2,ixjt + γkDk + ǫ (3)
where
Dk =
{
1; if Certain amount > reference point k
0; if Certain amount ≤ reference point k
Zijt is a binary variable which represents the choice of individual i
between the prospect (0.5, yt), and the certain amount on offer,
xjt , in period t. Zijt takes the value 1 if the individual chooses
the prospect, and 0 otherwise. Recall that all reference points
are net of the initial endowment. A significant coefficient for
the γk term would indicate the use of reference point k, as it
reveals a change in the likelihood of choosing the lottery when
the certain payment it is paired with exceeds the reference level.
In the regression, we control for the expected value of the lottery
and the level of the certain payment.
The model is estimated for each individual i and each
reference point k separately. An F-test is performed to test for the
significance of the restriction Dk = 0. If the resulting F-statistic
is above the critical level, and the estimated gamma coefficient is
negative, we will say that k is a reference point for the individual.
When this test is significant for candidate reference point k, we
say that the individual is using k as a reference point. Based on
the result of this test, we assign an individual to either none, one,
or multiple reference points. For each individual, the regression
is estimated for each of the potential reference points. Table 2
shows the incidence of each possible reference point profile in
the sample.
The table shows that the PA is the most common reference
point for individuals who used only one reference level, followed
by IE and HA. PE does not seem to serve as a reference point.
A sizable portion of subjects use multiple reference points, and
most of these individuals use PA paired with HA. Lastly, a
TABLE 2 | Reference point use by subjects.
Session All sample (%) Female (%) Male* (%)
2–24
None 17.83 16.66 20.57
Population Average (PA) 15.05 23.29 10.26
Individual Expectation (IE) 21.93 26.69 20.52
Historical Average (HA) 8.23 6.69 7.69
PA and IE 2.75 3.34 2.58
PA and HA 34.21 23.34 38.39
IE and HA 0 0 0
All 0 0 0
25–44
None 26.61 37.42 17.79
Population Average (PA) 62.27 52.53 73.38
Individual Expectation (IE) 2.23 0 2.23
Peer Expectation (PE) 0 0 0
PA and IE 8.88 10.05 6.61
PA and PE 0 0 0
IE and PE 0 0 0
All 0 0 0
*The gender variable contains 5 missing values.
non-negligible portion of individuals do not appear to employ
any of the candidate reference points. Gender differences are not
significant, with Fisher exacts tests resulting in p-values of 0.61
for sessions 2–24, and 0.097 for sessions 25–44.
Regressions with the specification in Equation (3) on the
aggregate pooled data from all individuals classified as using
each reference point provide an overall picture of the estimated
parameters, and of the strength of the attraction of each reference
point. Recall that each reference point, other than PA, is specified
as in addition to the initial endowment. The estimates are shown
in Tables 3, 4. The results show that an increase in the expected
value of the lottery increases the probability of choosing the
lottery. On the other hand, increasing the value of the certain
alternative decreases the probability of choosing the lottery. Each
of the reference points is negative and significant in both tables.
This indicates that for each of the reference points PA, HA, and
IE, a subset of subjects exhibits changes in behavior for payoff
levels above vs. below the reference point. When the certain
payoff exceeds the reference point, it is more likely to be chosen.
3.3. Income Shock
In the Shift treatment, we study the effect of a shock to an
individual’s income level and investigate whether it changes
the likelihood of choosing a particular reference point. In this
treatment, at the end of period 40, subjects experience a change in
their wealth.We increase their cash balance by 50% of their initial
endowment, an amount which differs among subjects. Then, in
the last 20 periods of the session, the same set of choices as
in the first 20 periods are presented to the subjects again. We
consider the effect of the shock on the choices of individuals in
the last 20 periods of the experiment and compare these to the
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TABLE 3 | Estimated effect of reference point in sessions 2–24.
(1) (2) (3)
choice choice choice
EV Lottery (0.5 * yt ) 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.06***
(7.48) (14.04) (10.39)
xjt −0.05*** −0.07*** −0.06***
(−9.55) (−16.09) (−13.61)
DPA −0.42***
(−16.01)
DIE −0.37***
(−15.69)
DHA −0.35***
(−11.04)
Gender −0.05 −0.02 −0.03
(−1.51) (−0.54) (−0.84)
Constant 0.61*** 0.49*** 0.64***
(19.95) (13.65) (18.02)
Observations 16,720 8616 12,896
(R2) 0.514 0.544 0.538
t statistics in parentheses.
Robust standard errors.
*** (p<0.01).
TABLE 4 | Estimated effect of reference point in sessions 25–44.
(1) (2)
choice choice
EV Lottery (0.5 * yt ) 0.06*** 0.07***
(11.63) (11.00)
xjt −0.05*** −0.05***
(−13.85) (−14.01)
DPA −0.46***
(−26.64)
DIE −0.33***
(−16.01)
Gender 0.02 −0.01
(0.81) (−0.32)
Constant 0.56*** 0.43***
(22.18) (9.91)
Observations 29,192 3824
(R2) 0.552 0.579
t statistics in parentheses.
Robust standard errors.
*** (p < 0.01).
choices elicited in the first segment of 20 periods, with respect to
which reference points most accurately characterize the decision
pattern.
We report the proportions of reference points that fit best
the decisions of these individuals in Table 5. The first column
reports a classification of individuals in relation to reference
points in periods 1–20 in the Shift treatment. The second column
contains analogous data from periods 41–60. The results show no
TABLE 5 | Reference points of subjects in Shift treatment before and after
the income shock.
Period 1–20 (%) Period 41–60 (%)
None 36.07 41.00
Population Average (PA) 59.00 57.35
Individual Expectation (IE) 1.64 0
Peer Expectation (PE) 3.29 0
PA and IE 0 0
PA and PE 0 0
IE and PE 0 1.64
All 0 0
significant difference in the incidence of the use of each reference
point before, compared to after, the shock. A Fisher exact test
of the equality of the distribution of reference points between
periods 1–20 and 41–60 results in p = 0.481. This may reflect
the fact that the shock, like initial income, is treated as a separate
source of wealth than the earnings from the experimental task.
4. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we document heterogeneity among individuals
in their personal inclination to use particular reference points.
It is known from previous work that the reference point that
characterizes a set of data best differs, depending on the setting
in which the decision is taking place. However, we show here
that the reference point that best fits the decision pattern of an
individual also differs by individual, keeping the decision setting
constant.
Our results do indicate that when individuals use a single
reference point, the population average payoff level is the most
frequently employed. This is followed by the anticipated payoff
level indicated for the individual, and in turn by the average
that comparable individuals have earned in past similar tasks.
No participant used the earnings of peers in the same session as
a reference point. The results are similar for men and women
and we observe no significant gender differences in the use of
reference points.
We also observe that a sizable fraction of individuals employs
multiple reference points. The most common combinations
of reference points are the population average with the
historical average, and the population average with the individual
expectation. It is striking to us that PA is such a strong attractor,
in light of the fact that the social distance between an individual
and the population average is arguably the greatest among all of
the reference points that we have considered. The experimental
design we have does not allow us to isolate the precise reason
that PA is more prominent than the others. However, it does
have the feature that it, along with HA, is historical and therefore
certain, while IE and PE are anticipated future payoff levels.
Furthermore, PA is always constant and known to be the same
for all individuals, while the three other reference points can
vary among individuals. Perhaps a reference payoff is more
compelling when it is common knowledge that it is the same for
everyone.
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We also find that a considerable share of subjects tend to
proportionally discount their certainty equivalent by a constant
percentage of the expected payoff of the risky lottery. Some of
these individuals also discount by a different fraction, depending
on whether payoffs are above or below one or more of
the reference points. The widespread use of the Proportional
Discounting Heuristic seems intuitive as a behavioral rule,
because it is simple to calculate and apply, though to our
knowledge its use has not been documented in previous
research.
Thus, our experiment illustrates two types of heterogeneity in
how individuals perceive risky decision making tasks. The first is
that some individuals differ in whether or not they apply a simple
heuristic, proportional discounting, to value the lottery, while
others adopt more complex or inconsistent valuation methods.
The second is that the reference level of earnings that individuals
use is idiosyncratic, with some individuals targeting one or more
from among a set of prominent reference points, while others
do not.
While a number of studies have focused on estimating the
mean andmedian loss aversion parameters of a particular sample,
a growing number of studies have documented heterogeneity
in the loss aversion level of individuals (Fehr and Goette, 2007;
Gächter et al., 2007; Von Gaudecker et al., 2011). Building on
this, other studies have investigated factors affecting the degree
of individual loss aversion and have found that demographic
characteristics play an important role (Hjorth and Fosgerau,
2009; Payne et al., 2015). Loss aversion only has meaning relative
to a reference point. Our results complement this line of research
by providing evidence that individuals exhibit different reference
points in a similar task. Thus, in addition to having different
levels of loss aversion, the reference points from which loss
aversion is defined, are heterogeneous.
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